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CLEARING UP SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
 Allow us first of all to take the opportunity to thank all commentators for careful reading and 
interesting and thought-provoking comments, some of them encouraging and others more critical, 
but all useful in our future work within our perspective of contextualised rational action. The original 
aim of our paper was to provoke a debate on the use of theory in housing research, and on that 
point, if nothing else, we have obviously been successful.1 In this response, we concentrate primarily 
on some general lines of criticism that come back in several of the comments. Consequently, instead 
of answering our commentators one at a time, we organise our response in much the same way as 
the article, i.e. beginning with the general perspective and then going on to the applications in 
tenant participation, housing management and comparative housing. First of all, something must be 
said about our general ambitions in the article, since these have been misunderstood by some of our 
critics. Bridget Franklin is disappointed with our concluding presentation of the strands of our 
theory, which she finds lame compared with our earlier ‘much stronger, if unsubstantiated’ claims. 
She also implies that we are out ‘completely to jettison’ the thinking of social constructionism and 
‘social’ realism. ‘Certainly that explanatory grand theory remains as elusive and as mired in 
confusion as ever’, she concludes her comment. Jim Kemeny also reads us as having high – almost 
Sisyphean – ambitions: ‘to reconcile subjectivity and objectivity, individual and society, actor and 
structure, micro and macro and a host of other dualities that have plagued the social sciences’. 
Unlike Franklin, however, he is not disappointed. How could we expect Somerville and Bengtsson to 
succeed where the giants of social science have failed? Tony Manzi, in contrast, agrees with us when 
we acknowledge that general theories need to be treated with scepticism and caution – but then 
rather confusingly accuses us of failing in ‘providing a macro-theory of housing’ and of ‘trying to fit a 
host of material into one all-embracing model’. The truth is that we have no such ambitions. Our 
claims are exactly those summarized in our conclusions: To criticize some interpretations of social 
constructionism and sociological (not ‘social’) realism, and to outline an alternative perspective 
based on thin rationality that would be applicable to different types of research questions without 
coming up against the ontological and epistemological problems of strong social constructionism 
and objectivist realism. We are not trying to jettison social constructionism, indeed – as we explicitly 
stress in the article – we have no quarrel with its weak version. And we are not presenting any grand 
general theory, only suggesting an analytical perspective of contextual rational action that may, 
depending on the context, be fruitfully combined with other lines of more substantive theory. This 
means middle-range theorising, and we explicitly state in the article that ‘a thinly rationalistic 
ontology and epistemology is antagonistic to the idea of general social laws of the type “if a then 
always b”’. 
 
1 We also wish to thank all colleagues who have commented on an earlier version of the paper, at 
the HSA Conference in Cardiff in September 2001 and at a seminar at Uppsala University in October 
2001, where Clarissa Kugelberg acted as a critical and constructive discussant of the paper. 
 
